When the Las Vegas Raiders lured Chip Kelly back to the NFL in early 2025, Silver and Black Nation drooled. The guy who turned Oregon into a points machine and won a ring at Ohio State would finally bring an innovative, tempo‑driven attack to the desert. Pete Carroll promised an “offensive mastermind,” and general manager John Spytek proclaimed that Kelly gets the most out of quarterbacks. What did Raider fans get? An offense that ranked near the bottom of every meaningful metric and a mid‑season firing. Raider Nation deserves answers, not clichés – so let’s peel back the film, the advanced metrics and the front‑office politics to understand why the Chip Kelly experiment went sideways and how Vegas can course‑correct.
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Kelly’s blueprint has always been about pace and spacing. At Oregon and in his first NFL stint, his offenses ran almost exclusively from shotgun and spread the field to create angles for inside‑ and outside‑zone runs. The up‑tempo pace prevented defenses from substituting and simplified reads for the quarterback. Kelly once told reporters that his playbook isn’t gimmicky – it is built around basic concepts (inside zone, outside zone, sweep and screens) executed quickly. The inside zone run – his “go‑to‑work” play – uses double‑team blocks to “knock the crap out of the defender” and produce cutback lanes. Spreading the defense also allowed the quarterback to become a runner or deliver run‑pass options without turning his back to the defense.
On paper, that philosophy matched the Raiders’ personnel. First‑round running back Ashton Jeanty was drafted for his explosive cutback ability. Tight end Brock Bowers was a matchup nightmare in space. The expectation was a shotgun‑based offense with tempo and misdirection. Instead, film shows an attack that looked more like the 2023 Seattle Seahawks than the 2012 Oregon Ducks. Kelly’s signature shotgun runs were dramatically limited, replaced by under‑center zone plays and long-developing passes that resembled Carroll’s preferred offense.
What Went Wrong: Scheme, Personnel and Execution
1. Misaligned Philosophies
Coach interference. Reports from defensive coordinators and Raiders insiders noted that the 2025 offense was closer to Shane Waldron’s 2023 Seahawks scheme than Kelly’s college offense. Sources said Carroll heavily influenced play selection, favouring under‑center runs over Kelly’s shotgun concepts. The offense lacked the tempo and spacing that define Kelly’s system, so defenders could substitute and disguise blitzes.
Botched play calls. NFL Network’s Tom Pelissero reported that Kelly repeatedly botched play calls. He would forget to tag motions, leaving receivers on the wrong side, or call plays that weren’t in the game plan. Raiders Beat corroborated that coaches and players were often confused, citing instances where Geno Smith was at the line of scrimmage wondering why the formation didn’t match the call. Such miscommunication is rare in the NFL and was a major reason Carroll fired Kelly after 11 games.
Injuries and roster construction. Kelly built his offseason installation around Bowers and the offensive line. Bowers was hurt in Week 1; left tackle Kolton Miller and rookie guard Jackson Powers‑Johnson soon followed. These three were arguably the Raiders’ best offensive players. The injuries forced backups into starting roles and hamstrung the run game. At the same time, four rookie playmakers (Jack Bech, Dont’e Thornton, Caleb Rogers and Charles Grant) barely saw the field, indicating poor developmental planning.
Quarterback play. Geno Smith was hand‑picked by Carroll but did not resemble the efficient passer he was in Seattle. He led the league in interceptions (13) and was often at odds with the play call. Without an effective run game to set up play‑action, Smith was a sitting duck behind an overmatched offensive line. He deserves blame for forcing throws, but the lack of clear, consistent design made his job nearly impossible.
2. The Data Behind the Disaster
Offensive ranking comparison (2024 vs. 2025)
The Raiders offense was poor in 2024 under Luke Getsy and Scott Turner. Shockingly, it regressed further in 2025 with Kelly at the helm.
Season | Points per game (Rank) | Total yards per game (Rank) | Rushing yards per game (Rank) | Red-zone TD rate (Rank) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
2024 (Getsy/Turner) | 18.18 ppg, 29th | 303.2 yds, 27th | 79.8 yds, 32nd | 48.9 % TD rate, 27th |
2025 (Kelly) | 15 ppg, 31st | 272.7 yds, 30th | 87.4 yds, 29th | 47.8 % TD rate, 28th |
The small bump in rushing yardage came at the cost of explosive plays. The offense scored fewer points and gained fewer yards despite adding Jeanty and Bowers. Instead of closing the gap on Kansas City’s high‑flying attack, the Raiders fell further behind – a bitter pill for fans who expected a 2025 leap.
Advanced efficiency metrics (2025)
According to SumerSports’ 2025 offensive team stats, the Raiders produced an NFL‑worst –0.21 EPA per play with a success rate of 37.34 %. Their EPA per pass was –0.19 and EPA per rush –0.26. The offense averaged just 6.49 yards downfield per pass attempt, indicating a conservative attack. Smith completed 66.02 % of his passes but threw only 20 touchdowns. The run game produced 1,317 yards and five rushing TDs. A 10.65 % sack rate underscores the protection issues. An interception percentage of 3.16 % and low scramble rate (3.66 %) highlight a stationary, turnover‑prone quarterback.
These numbers confirm what film suggests: the Raiders were inefficient on both early downs and in the red zone. They rarely created explosive plays, and negative plays (sacks, penalties, turnovers) derailed drives.
3. Offensive Weaknesses on Film
Lack of tempo and deception. Without tempo, the Raiders became predictable. Defensive fronts could call line stunts and disguised blitzes. The offense rarely snapped the ball with more than 15 seconds on the play clock, negating the confusion that Kelly’s college teams thrived on.
Under‑center tendencies. Carroll favored under‑center wide‑zone runs reminiscent of his Seahawks days. This forced Jeanty to run outside zone behind a patchwork line instead of the downhill inside zone he excelled at. Defenses keyed on wide stretch plays, and the Raiders averaged a league‑low yards before contact. In shotgun looks, the run game often lacked the backside cutoff and double teams that make the inside zone work.
Predictable personnel usage. The Raiders leaned heavily on three‑wide sets. Bowers’ injury eliminated their two‑tight end packages, and they rarely shifted or motioned to create mismatches. Opponents countered with nickel personnel and disguised zone coverage, daring Smith to throw outside the numbers.
Quarterback limitations. Geno Smith’s strengths are rhythm passing and play‑action off run fakes. The lack of a consistent run threat and constant pressure forced him to speed up his reads. He hesitated on vertical throws and forced passes into coverage. His 13 interceptions led the NFL, and he seldom used his legs to extend plays (scramble rate 3.66 %). When rookie quarterback Fernando Mendoza saw late‑season reps, he struggled with protection calls and blitz recognition.
Why Kelly’s Scheme Was Unsuccessful
No identity. A successful offense has a clear foundation – think Kyle Shanahan’s outside zone, Andy Reid’s West Coast/RPO blend, or Sean McVay’s motion‑heavy play‑action. Kelly’s usual identity (shotgun, tempo, inside zone and packaged RPOs) was stripped away. The Raiders lacked a bread‑and‑butter concept to lean on in critical moments. Without rhythm, the play calls looked random – inside runs on long yardage, deep drops behind a battered line, then short passes on third‑and‑long.
Philosophical clash. Carroll and Kelly had long been friendly competitors – they coached against each other in the Pac‑12 and shared ideas. However, their offensive philosophies are drastically different. Carroll is a defensive coach who believes in complementary football: run the ball, control clock, limit turnovers. Kelly believes in maximizing possessions and wearing down defenses with speed. Sources said Carroll was heavy‑handed in shaping the offense, limiting Kelly’s autonomy. The result was a hybrid scheme that satisfied no one.
Execution and attention to detail. Botched play calls undermine trust. When a coach forgets to signal motion or calls plays not practiced that week, players lose confidence. It’s telling that Geno Smith never publicly criticized Kelly despite the mistakes – veterans know not to throw coaches under the bus – but body language on film showed frustration. Offensive linemen looked confused about assignments, and receivers occasionally failed to adjust routes.
Roster fit. Kelly’s offense thrives with an athletic offensive line and a dual‑threat quarterback. The Raiders fielded a patchwork line and a pocket passer. Injuries made matters worse. The front office spent high picks on rookies who hardly played, signalling misalignment between scouting and coaching priorities.
What the Raiders Can Do Differently This Year
The Raiders already moved on, hiring Klint Kubiak as offensive coordinator for 2026. But Raider Nation wants assurance that this season won’t repeat the 2025 nightmare. Here’s a blueprint:
Commit to an offensive identity. Whether it’s Kubiak’s Shanahan‑style outside zone or a modern West Coast scheme, the offense must have a clear foundation. Use Jeanty’s vision and contact balance in a downhill zone scheme and build play‑action shots off it. Resist the urge to blend every coach’s favorite play; pick a handful of core concepts and master them.
Fix the offensive line. Drafting Jackson Powers‑Johnson showed commitment to the trenches, but injuries exposed the depth. Use free agency and Day 2 picks to add swing tackles and interior linemen. A healthy Kolton Miller is a top‑10 left tackle; keeping him upright is non‑negotiable.
Develop young weapons. The 2025 rookies (Bech, Thornton, Rogers, Grant) barely played. Under Kubiak, they must have defined roles. Slot receiver Tre Tucker flashed in spurts and should be used on jet sweeps and drag routes to stress defenses horizontally. Bowers, if healthy, can be the centerpiece – line him up inline, in the slot and even out wide to exploit mismatches.
Simplify quarterback reads. Geno Smith or another quarterback (rookie Fernando Mendoza or a 2026 draft pick) should operate a system built on quick reads with layered route concepts. Use play‑action, bootlegs and half‑field reads to cut the field in half. RPOs can be incorporated, but only after establishing a run game.
Embrace motion and tempo situationally. Kelly’s mistake wasn’t the concept of tempo; it was abandoning it altogether or using it without practice. Use motion at the snap and tempo in spurts to catch defenses off balance. The Kansas City Chiefs and San Francisco 49ers use motion to create leverage, not just to look fancy. The Raiders should follow suit.
Lean on the defense. Patrick Graham’s unit has been competitive despite limited resources. A complementary offense that controls the ball and limits turnovers will keep star defender Maxx Crosby fresher and shorten games. In 2026, winning ugly might be the path back to relevance.
The Carroll–Kelly Relationship: A Post‑Mortem
During their Pac‑12 days, Kelly and Carroll respected each other and occasionally exchanged ideas. That respect may have blinded the Raiders’ leadership to the philosophical mismatch. In retrospect, it was wishful thinking to believe a 74‑year‑old defensive head coach would relinquish offensive control to a tempo‑obsessed innovator. The relationship devolved as losses mounted; sources said Kelly was frustrated by the lack of autonomy, while Carroll grew wary of miscommunication. The breakup was inevitable. Raider Nation should take solace that the marriage ended quickly, avoiding prolonged dysfunction.
Were the Raiders Making Bad Play Calls?
Yes – both in selection and execution. The film shows sequences where the Raiders ran three straight under‑center runs into eight‑man boxes. They often threw short of the sticks on third down, and there was little sequencing to set up plays. Combine that with reported miscues – missing motion tags, calling plays not in the game plan – and it’s clear the call sheet was a mess. It wasn’t just that the plays were bad; they were poorly communicated and ill‑timed.
Play‑Design Improvements for 2026
Use layered route concepts. Kubiak should incorporate levels concepts (deep dig, intermediate crosser, shallow drag) to stress both man and zone coverage. This gives quarterbacks high‑to‑low progressions and built‑in check‑downs.
Incorporate misdirection. Jet motion, orbit motion and bluff pulls hold linebackers and safeties, creating running lanes. Pair split‑zone runs with bootleg keepers to punish over‑aggressive edge defenders.
Leverage personnel versatility. Bowers, Mayer and Jeanty can line up anywhere. Use 12‑personnel (two tight ends) to force base defenses onto the field, then split Bowers wide to create mismatches. Mix heavy formations with spread looks to keep opponents guessing.
Adjust tempo situationally. Rather than going warp speed every play, sprinkle hurry‑up drives after explosive plays or when defenses substitute. It’s about rhythm, not chaos.
Coordinate protection. Use slide protections, half‑slide with a man side, and chip help to mitigate pass‑rush mismatches. Teach quarterbacks to set protections and identify hot routes pre‑snap.
Future Outlook
The Raiders enter 2026 with tempered expectations but a clearer vision. Spytek’s bold swing on Kelly didn’t pay off, but the organization moved quickly to change course. With a young core (Jeanty, Bowers, defensive stars Maxx Crosby and Tyree Wilson) and cap flexibility, the team can rebuild its offensive identity. Kubiak comes from the Shanahan tree, known for run‑game mastery and quarterback‑friendly designs. If the offensive line stays healthy and the play calling becomes coherent, the Raiders could field a league‑average offense – which, combined with Graham’s defense, might be enough to sneak into the playoffs. But Raider Nation must stay patient; one coordinator change won’t erase years of offensive ineptitude. Investing in the trenches, developing young playmakers and embracing a cohesive philosophy will determine whether Vegas stays lost in the desert or finds the oasis.
FAQ
Q: Why didn’t Kelly’s college success translate to Vegas?
A: His trademark tempo and shotgun run game were curtailed by Pete Carroll’s influence. Without autonomy, he couldn’t install his full system. Injuries and a roster that didn’t fit his style compounded the problem.
Q: Was Geno Smith the main problem?
A: Smith’s interceptions and pocket awareness hurt, but he was set up to fail. The protection was shaky, the run game ineffective, and play calls were often confusing. Any quarterback would struggle in that environment.
Q: How did injuries affect the offense?
A: The Raiders lost tight end Brock Bowers and two starting linemen (Kolton Miller and Jackson Powers‑Johnson) early. Those injuries removed the focal point of the passing game and destabilized the line. They also forced backups into roles they weren’t ready for.
Q: What does the Carroll‑Kelly fallout teach us about coach hires?
A: Philosophical fit matters as much as résumé. Even talented coaches will fail if they can’t implement their system. Aligning head coach, coordinator and personnel vision is critical.
Q: Should Raider fans expect immediate results under Kubiak?
A: Improvement is likely because the offense can’t get much worse, but don’t expect a top‑five unit overnight. The 2026 season should focus on establishing an identity, developing young players and protecting the quarterback. If those boxes are checked, wins will follow.
The Chip Kelly era in Las Vegas is over, but its lessons could guide the Raiders’ next act. Raider Nation craves an offense that matches the passion of the Black Hole – relentless, creative and tough. With the right plan and patience, that day might finally come.